Karabakh\u2019s Twenty Years Crisis: The EU Should Do More by Ditrych, Ondrej
Ondrej Ditrych
Karabakh’s Twenty Years
Crisis: The EU Should
Do More
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Twenty years have passed since an armistice in the Nagorno Karabakh
conflict was concluded. EU can and should do more to facilitate its reso-
lution.
The Union’s security interests are at stake (energy), and it can use the
hitherto neglected conflict to boost credibility of its foreign and security
policy (CFSP) in the context of the Ukraine crisis which additionally makes
the conflict parties (Armenia, Azerbaijan) uneasy of Russia’s intentions, a
fact that the EU can use to its advantage.
The EU can notably mobilize its comprehensive approach to address the
conflict, promote a conciliatory narrative of history and future of peaceful
coexistence, and declare readiness to assume peacekeeping tasks under
the CSDP.
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Twenty years ago, on 12 May 1994, a ceasefire came into effect that ended the war in
Nagorno Karabakh. Ever since, uneasy truce exists between parties Azerbaijan and Ar-
menia, parties to the conflict. Inflammatory rhetoric has proliferated; and periodical
skirmishes along the line of contact have cost more than 3,000 lives. The EU, while de-
signing an ambitious agenda to create a ring of peaceful and prosperous states in its
neighbourhood, has so far eschewed more direct engagement. This policy paper argues
that it should eschew it no longer, and outlines how it can do so without excessive com-
mitment on its part.
The Conflict
When the ethnic conflict broke once again between Azerbaijani and Armenians in the
late 1980s – it was the third time that century – the result was a bloody war. The
(Moscow) centre ‘could not hold’, and two of the newly independent republics of the
South Caucasus wrestled over a piece of mountainous land which is poor on resources
but plays a crucial role in the ethnosymbolic narratives from which their modern na-
tional identities had been performatively constituted in the Soviet times – Nagorno
Karabakh (1992–1994). By the time the Bishkek ceasefire agreement was concluded, Ar-
menia had taken control not only of 92.5% of the former autonomous oblast which ad-
ministratively had once been part of the Azerbaijani SSR (a quasistate Nagorno
Karabakh Republic was declared in 1992), but also of seven neighbouring raions, carv-
ing a cordon sanitaire twice the size of the Nagorno Karabakh into Azerbaijan that Ar-
menians have held ever since.
A new geopolitical reality was thus created. The 250km-long ‘line of control’ now sepa-
rates the two hostile nations, protected by 20,000 soldiers on each side; 1.5 million peo-
ple were forced from their homes as a result of the broader ethnic conflict (some 500,000
Azerbaijani fled Nagorno Karabakh and particularly the neighbouring raions); and the
state border between Armenia and Turkey (Azerbaijani ally) has been closed since 1993,
causing Yerevan to incur substantial opportunity costs and increasing its sense of encir-
clement. (Protocols were signed on reopening of the border during a brief period of rap-
prochement in 2009, but the process of their ratification remains stalled.) After two
decades of mediation by OSCE Minsk Group, represented by the Troika of U.S., France
and Russia (which in the past few years all but dominated the process, while it inciden-
tally also has been arming both parties of the conflict), the peace process is no closer to
the conclusion. For the time being, therefore, this geopolitical reality continues to de-
fine this part of European neighbourhood, all but preventing regional cooperation and
always threatening a ‘from ancient grudge break to a new mutiny’ scenario. Such sce-
nario would most likely feature an initial conflagration by accident which could howev-
er likely move up the escalation ladder due to different perceptions of the parties re-
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garding the conflict outcomes, having as a consequence broader instability in the region
due to a possible involvement by Russia and/or Turkey, and resulting, among other, in
disruption of energy flows to the European markets through the ‘Southern Corridor’.
The EU Should Do More… and It Can
A decade ago, the EU set as its objective a creation of secure and prosperous neighbour-
hood. In the Eastern neighbourhood, it has offered funds and better access to the single
market on the condition that partner countries reform politically and economically.
Without the membership perspective, however, the offer under the heading of Euro-
pean Neigbourhood Policy (ENP) never seemed to be good enough to make the local po-
litical elites bear the substantial costs of transition. Moreover, Russia has weighed in,
striving to reclaim its near abroad and prevent its gravitation to the West.
While it has become engaged in the other unresolved ethnopolitical conflicts in the
South Caucasus (Abkhazia, South Ossetia), the EU has played only a limited role in the
Nagorno Karabakh peace process. True, it has not ignored the conflict entirely. But safe
for a few declarations by the Council and the European Parliament, EEAS’ floating an
idea of ‘region without conflicts’ as a platform for dialogue, or the support from the
EU’s Instrument for Stability of the European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of
the Conflict over Nagorno Karabakh (EPNK), a civil society initiative bringing together
five NGOs led by International Alert and organising events focused on the youth and
journalists in both countries, it has done little to date to bring about its resolution.
It should. Given the likelihood and negative consequences of the new escalation for its
own security in terms of regional instability and interrupted flows of energy), from the
EU’s perspective more involvement is a small investment that promises to yield a con-
siderable dividend. Moreover, the Karabakh conflict is an opportunity for the EU to
show resolve in its foreign policy at a moment of crisis brought about by the develop-
ment in the Ukraine and start redesigning its approach toward the region where Russia’s
neighbours once lured by the unresistable temptations of the Eurasian Union (Armenia)
or boasting of its independence from one and all (Azerbaijan) may increasingly have
second thoughts.
The EU cannot resolve the conflict single-handedly. It cannot make the parties an ‘offer
they can’t refuse’. But it can contribute to the peace process in three practicable ways:
• integrating the issue into its comprehensive approach vis-à-vis the conflict parties;
• promoting of what Tom de Waal called the ‘third narrative’ of the both nations’ in-
tertwined histories (and futures);
• and declaring readiness to assume future peacekeeping tasks under the CSDP.
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Mobilising EU’s Comprehensive Approach
The influence of the EU vis-à-vis the parties of the conflict appears to have suffered re-
cently. Armenia was gravitating closer to the EU as a new association agreement and a
deep and comprehensive free trade agreement (DCFTA) were foreseen to be initialled at
the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius last November; but it was forced to change
its mind. However, Yerevan has no intention to be swallowed by the increasingly impe-
rialist and revanchist Russia, and could now more than ever be willing to reconsider the
benefits of a more open approach on the Karabakh conflict. The EU should do its best
to support such possible development.
Regarding Azerbaijan, energy relations are becoming ever tighter. But the EU should rec-
ognize that this indeed increases the mutual dependence between the two, but in an
asymmetrical way favourable to the EU rather than the other way around, despite the
public affairs companies hired by Baku’s convincing.
The EU could make better use of the leverage it has to stimulate positive steps by the par-
ties by combining carrots and sticks in its ‘comprehensive approach’ arsenal. These
steps include, above all:
• ensuring unimpeded access of the EU representatives to Nagorno Karabakh;
• putting in place much needed CBMs on the line of control (like incident investigation
mechanisms, in principle agreed by the parties);
• tempering the belligerent rhetoric on both sides and actions increasing the tension
on the part of Azerbaijan (e.g. statements on restoring territorial integrity immedi-
ately followed by military exercises near Nagorno Karabakh);
• conciliatory measures on the part of Armenia that would make Baku agree with the
‘interim status’ for Nagorno Karabakh and allow progress on the implementation of
other basic ‘Madrid Principles’ for the conflict resolution (unilateral removal of
snipers from the line of control, and even giving up of a few raions along the Araxes
river, which in turn could be reciprocated by opening of the borders with Turkey, ru-
moured to make such quid pro quo proposition to Armenia in 2012);
• continuing detailed discussion of the Madrid Principles (made public at the G8
L’Aquila summit in 2009 and elaborated since) in general, which besides the interim
status include Armenian gradual withdrawal from the raions surrounding Nagorno
Karabakh, maintaining land communication between the territory and Armenia
through the Lachin corridor, decision on the final status, return of the displaced per-
sons, and international guarantees, including deployment of international peace-
keeping force.
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Promoting a Narrative of Peace
The comprehensive approach can be mobilised not only to change the expected utility
of the governmental actors. It can also be used to root a new narrative of peace in the
two societies. The assumption here is that ‘conflict transformation’ (conceptually dif-
ferent from ‘conflict resolution’ in the understanding of the need of broad societal en-
gagement to achieve peaceful outcomes) is necessary to remove one of the main obsta-
cles of the peace process: the societies’ ‘ontological insecurity’, their trench mentality
and effective routinisation of the conflict as known experience (contrasted to the peace
as an unknown condition for more and more people on each side).
To promote trust, routine intersocietal interactions and emergence of compatible (col-
lective) life narratives, the EU may build on its previous activities (ENPK), but it should
provide more generous funding for platforms where people shaping these narratives
can meet and interact. The success of such endeavour is premised on both governments’
acceptance of the increased openness. The combination of incentives (boosting effica-
cy of state agencies to deliver public goods, and promising to substitute the ‘national se-
curity state’ as a source of the regimes’ legitimacy) and pressure could be used to ensure
their cooperation. Second, the EU should act as to enable emergence of, rather than dic-
tate the ‘third narrative’, which in very general contours should – instead of emphasis-
ing past grievances and perceived injustices – include references to the historical peri-
ods of peaceful and prosperous cohabitation of both ethnicities in Karabakh (e.g. in the
Karabakh Khanate), but mainly advance the vision of future defined more by peace and
security than certain political boundaries.
EU** Karabakh
The idea of a peacekeeping mission in Nagorno Karabakh dates back to the days of the
Bishkek ceasefire agreement. When the late Azerbaijani President Haydar Aliyev refused
Moscow’s proposal for a CIS operation, the CSCE/OSCE peacekeeping mandate was
agreed instead. But while the OSCE has developed some institutional capacity to engage
with conflicts at different stages, it has not yet conducted a single peacekeeping opera-
tion and its mandate now seems all but expired. Instead, the idea of a CSDP operation
in support of the implementation of the peace deal (once reached) in Karabakh has ap-
peared in several EU’s statements in recent years, notably declarations issued by the Eu-
ropean Parliament.
Many possible geometries of a future CSDP mission (or missions) can be envisioned.
Based on the premise that the CSDP capacities should be deployed in support of the im-
plementation of the Madrid Principles – the basic template for conflict resolution on
the table – the following tasks for the peacekeeping force can be identified:
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• monitoring the withdrawal of Armenian / NKR forces from a) the first five raions and
some villages in Lachin, and later b) the rest of Lachin and Kelbajar and these territo-
ries’ demilitarisation (this is conditioned on Armenia giving up these lands which
were initially conceived of only as a ‘security zone’, but over the years have become
increasingly depicted as ‘liberated territories’ forming part of the historical province
of Artsakh in general discourse);
• overseeing the return of displaced persons and facilitating their (re)integration in
Nagorno Karabakh (tensions can be expected due to unequal access to post-conflict
development resources) and the territory’s demilitarisation (according to the Inter-
national Crisis Group, it is currently one of the most militarised societies in the
world), while also ensuring the protection of Armenian population in Lachin and
Kelbajar;
• providing security in the Lachin corridor (after the Lachin raion is handed back by Ar-
menia) which is the most important land connection between Armenia and Nagorno
Karabakh (but also, in case of reopening of the Agdam road, providing Azerbaijani
with the fastest connection to the Nakhchivan exclave).
These variable tasks could be performed partly in parallel and partly in sequence over a
longer period of time by a) one CSDP mission with multidimensional mandate, b) sev-
eral successive (‘specialised’) missions or c) by several specialised missions with only
partial EU’s participation. In the last case, the CSDP mission(s) could complement oth-
er missions either by the UN or OSCE. All these configurations moreover allow for the
possibility of a hybrid mission (combining civilian and military components), as well
as the involvement of other interested parties, not ruling out even Russia (which has
previously participated in CSDP either through providing a contingent for EUFOR
Chad, or seconding personnel to EUPM Bosnia and Herzegovina).
The EU should arrive at a consensus that deploying CSDP capacities in Karabakh in the
future is desirable. It should also engage in the discussion about practicality of different
geometries and develop a set of feasible scenarios for future engagement that could be
communicated to the conflict parties as a basis for further negotiations. Finally, it
should aim at making the peacekeeping process as inclusive as possible. (In case of one
of the ‘non-participatory’ geometries, this could be achieved through presence of Russ-
ian and Turkish liaison officers).
In other words, the EU should not postpone the preliminary deliberation on a possible
future CSDP mission until a breakthrough in the peace process takes place, since by
demonstrating that it is ready to assume an active role in the post-conflict phase it could
actually bring the deal closer.
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